The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Institutions by William M. Gentry & John Penrod
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing For-Profit and
Not-for-Profit Institutions
Volume Author/Editor: David M. Cutler, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-13219-6
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/cutl00-1
Publication Date: January 2000
Chapter Title: The Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Hospitals
Chapter Author: William M. Gentry, John Penrod
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6769
Chapter pages in book: (p. 285 - 324)The Tax Benefits of 
Not-for-Profit Hospitals 
William M. Gentry and John R. Penrod 
9.1  Introduction 
Not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals in the United States receive several tax 
advantages relative to for-profit (FP) hospitals. The major tax advantages 
are exemption from federal and state corporate income taxes, exemption 
from state and local property taxes, and access to tax-exempt bond financ- 
ing. In addition, charitable contributions to NFP hospitals are tax deduct- 
ible for the donor. The expansion of FP hospitals over the last 15 years 
has led to increased scrutiny of why  NFP hospitals receive a tax prefer- 
ence. Our objective is  to quantify  the importance  of  this array  of  tax 
breaks for NFP hospitals, assuming that the behavior of hospitals is other- 
wise static. We  are interested in both the magnitude of these benefits and 
the heterogeneity of these benefits across hospitals. 
The concern over whether NFP hospitals provide enough social benefits 
to justify their tax exemption has led to research comparing the social 
benefits of NFP hospitals with the cost in terms of forgone tax revenue of 
the tax exemption. If, as managers of FP hospitals contend, the social 
benefits of NFP hospitals are less than this tax cost, then the tax exemp- 
tions seem difficult to justify. Clement, Smith, and Wheeler (1994) present 
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a methodology for measuring community benefits from not-for-profit hos- 
pitals and the size of the tax benefits of NFP status; they apply their meth- 
odology to a sample of NFP hospitals in California. They find consider- 
able heterogeneity in the level  of  community benefits provided by  NFP 
hospitals; depending on their recommended community benefit standard, 
between 20 and 80 percent of NFP hospitals have benefits exceeding their 
costs. As emphasized by  Sloan (1997), the trade-off between the benefits 
and costs of NFP status should be  evaluated relative to what would be 
provided by  FP hospitals. Sloan argues that the massive changes in the 
U.S. health care market have pushed NFP hospitals to become more simi- 
lar to FP operations. 
Rather than divide our attention between community benefits and tax 
benefits, we  focus on the underlying determinants of the value of the tax 
benefits and estimate the magnitude and heterogeneity of each tax break 
throughout the United States. The level of tax benefits will vary substan- 
tially across NFP hospitals. For the income tax, this variation will arise 
mainly from differences in profitability, capital intensity, state corporate 
tax rates, and the types of investment undertaken by  the hospital (since 
effective  tax rates vary across types of assets). The value of property tax 
exemption varies because hospitals differ in their use of capital and be- 
cause property tax rates, assessment practices, and the definition of the 
property tax base (e.g., the inclusion of different types of property) vary 
across locations. 
While the property tax exemption applies across the whole spectrum of 
NFP hospitals and the income tax exemption is valuable for NFP hospi- 
tals with net income, the use of tax-exempt bonds and charitable contribu- 
tions are concentrated in a subset of hospitals. The value of the access to 
tax-exempt bonds depends on how much tax-exempt debt a hospital has 
in its capital structure. While NFP hospitals benefit from the lower interest 
rate on tax-exempt debt relative to using taxable debt, FP hospitals might 
have a lower after-tax cost of borrowing since they can deduct their inter- 
est payments from their corporate income tax base. Tax-exempt bonds can 
also create opportunities for tax arbitrage. Hospitals differ in their reliance 
on charitable contributions depending on the mission of the hospital. The 
value of  the tax benefit from the charitable contribution accrues directly 
to the donor and depends on the donor’s marginal tax rate; however, this 
tax deduction can create an additional incentive for giving by  changing 
the “price” of a donation. 
In summary, we  find that NFP hospitals receive substantial benefits 
from reduced capital taxes. For 1995, the aggregate value of the exemption 
from federal and state income taxes is $4.6 billion and the aggregate prop- 
erty tax exemption is $1.7 billion. For the median hospital, these tax ex- 
emptions are worth roughly 2.5 percent of the value of total assets each The Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Hospitals  287 
year.' The benefit of the exemption from income taxes varies widely across 
hospitals because it depends on the profitability of the hospital. In con- 
trast, the variation in the benefits from the exemption from property taxes 
comes more from variation in state and local tax rules than from differ- 
ences in hospital operating characteristics. We estimate that the aggregate 
benefits of  the access to tax-exempt bond markets are $354 million per 
year and that donors received $1.1 billion of tax benefits from contributing 
to NFP hospitals in 1994. While these benefits are smaller than the bene- 
fits from the capital tax exemptions, they are highly concentrated among 
larger NFP hospitals. Our research provides a framework for discussing 
the tax benefits of NFP status and estimates of these benefits. However, 
future research is needed on how these tax advantages ultimately affect 
health  care.  Without  examining hospital  behavior,  we  cannot  answer 
whether these tax advantages improve the quality of health care, redistrib- 
ute resources toward the less advantaged, lead to less efficient choices in 
allocating resources, or accrue to providers of noncapital inputs. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 9.2 reviews some of the justifica- 
tions for special tax policies toward NFP hospitals. Section 9.3 compares 
some basic characteristics of NFP and FP hospitals in terms of  size and 
outputs. Section 9.4 discusses and imputes the value of capital tax exemp- 
tions. In section 9.5, we  examine NFP hospitals' use of tax-exempt bond 
financing. Section 9.6 discusses the tax benefits of tax-deductible charita- 
ble contributions. Section 9.7 links our results to dynamic considerations 
and the ultimate incidence of who benefits from the tax treatment of NFP 
hospitals. Section 9.8 concludes with suggestions for further research. 
9.2  Justifications for Tax Policy toward Not-for-Profit Hospitals 
This section briefly reviews the arguments used to  justify tax exemptions 
for NFP hospitals. These justifications fall in three categories: historical, 
administrative, and theoretical. 
9.2.1  Historical Perspective on the NFP Hospital Tax Exemption 
Not-for-profit organizations have been exempt from the U.S. federal in- 
come tax since its inception early in the twentieth century.2  At the time, 
NFP organizations accounted for a small portion of  the economy and 
engaged mainly in charitable activities. In general, hospitals were  orga- 
nized as not-for-profit, affiliated with either religious groups or philan- 
1. Since our estimates are based on observed levels of capital and profitability, they are 
likely to be a lower bound on the capital tax revenue that would be realized if these hospitals 
were converted to for-profit institutions. 
2. See Hansmann (1981) for a review of the rationales on exempting NFP organizations 
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thropic foundations, and served families that could not afford to pay the 
doctor to visit their home. These NFP hospitals provided public benefits, 
financed most of  their investment through charitable gifts, and did not 
generate substantial “income” that would be subject to tax. Thus, histori- 
cally, NFP hospitals received tax preferences because they provided public 
services and earned little profit. 
As noted by Marmor, Schlesinger, and Smithey (1987), drastic changes 
in medical technology and financing changed the role of  hospitals in so- 
ciety. Technological advances transformed hospitals from places for the 
poor to seek comfort to places for the sick, regardless of income, to get 
well.  The growth in private health insurance and government funding of 
health care of the poor and elderly made it viable to finance investment 
with revenues from patients. Hence, the purely historical arguments for 
the tax exemptions have grown less relevant. 
9.2.2  Administrative Perspective on the NFP Hospital Tax Exemption 
In addition to the historical reasons for the tax exemption, administra- 
tive, or legal, issues also arise for taxing NFP organizations. For the in- 
come tax, NFP organizations present challenges for measuring income. 
As discussed by  Bittker and Rahdert (1976), donations received by  NFP 
hospitals could be  designated either as taxable revenue (the donor has 
“purchased” a good) or as nontaxable gifts received; likewise, the charity 
provided to individuals could be classified as a deductible business expense 
or as a nondeductible gift. Hansmann (1981) argues that these measure- 
ment problems are overstated for  “commercial” NFPs-organizations, 
such as hospitals, that rely heavily on revenues from goods and services 
rather than donations. 
Attributing the “income” of a NFP organization to “owners” also cre- 
ates administrative problems. For many NFPs, income is small; however, 
for commercial NFPs (rather than donative NFPs), income is the business 
equivalent of “retained earnings.” Even though retained earnings cannot 
be distributed, they measure the capital income generated by  the NFP. If 
a religious or charitable organization is the “owner” of  the income, one 
could argue that the income should face a zero marginal tax rate. However, 
since the corporate-level tax is an entity-level tax, the counterargument is 
that the NFP should pay the entity-level tax but the tax-exempt owner 
should not pay taxes on distributions. These administrative concerns are 
much smaller for the property tax since ownership can be assigned to the 
NFP organization, which could be held liable for the tax payment. 
To qualify for the income tax exemption, organizations face two tests: 
organizational and operational.  The organizational test, also called the 
nondistribution  constraint, requires that the NFP “own” itself; revenues 
in  excess  of expenses must be reinvested in  the hospital’s mission. The 
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firm’s income and cannot operate for the private inurement of interested 
parties. This restriction implies that the NFP hospital cannot transfer the 
profits to physicians or directors through  excessive compensation. The 
operational test requires the NFP hospital to have an exclusively chari- 
table purpose. If a NFP hospital engages in profit-making activities unre- 
lated to its primary mission, it faces an unrelated business income tax that 
is equivalent to the income tax that would have been paid on the earnings 
from these activities. The requirement of being exclusively charitable has 
raised both federal and state policy concerns regarding what constitutes 
charitable activity.3 
9.2.3  Theoretical Arguments for the NFP Hospital Tax Exemption 
Economic theory suggests that governments may want special tax treat- 
ment (either a subsidy or lower tax rate) for activities when a competitive 
market would fail to produce an efficient outcome. Market failures can 
arise from private agents underproviding public goods (i.e,, goods that 
are nonrival in consumption) or goods that generate positive externalities. 
Hospital activities that may create positive externalities include research 
and development, community education, medical education (to the degree 
health care professionals do not capture these benefits through returns to 
human capital), and disease control. Since FP firms only enter markets 
with nonnegative expected economic profits, they may underproduce hos- 
pital outputs that are not profitable. If the social benefits of these outputs 
exceed their private returns, then a subsidy to encourage the provision of 
these outputs may  be justified. While society might want to encourage 
goods with positive externalities, subsidies tied to the provision of these 
goods (when feasible) would be more effective at encouraging the desired 
behaviors than would income or property tax exemptions. 
Another potential market failure that NFP hospitals may help solve is 
related to information problems in health care  market^.^ The NFP organi- 
zational form may reduce these information problems relative to FP firms. 
If NFP hospitals face other organizational disadvantages, such as lack of 
access to equity capital markets, then the tax exemptions may  increase 
economic efficiency by encouraging the NFP form despite its other disad- 
vantages. Hansmann (198  1) argues that offsetting the not-for-profit’s  capi- 
tal constraint is  a more appealing argument for the tax exemption than 
administrative reasons or encouraging the provision of community bene- 
fits. However, using a general equilibrium model, Goodspeed and Kenyon 
(1993) conclude that the tax exemption is a second-best method to counter 
the capital constraint. 
3. See Frank and Salkever (1994) for a brief description of  some of the recent  policy 
4. Frank and Salkever (1994) review models in which NFP status creates trust with cus- 
challenges to NFP hospitals. 
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In addition to efficiency grounds, equity arguments are also made to 
support the NFP  hospital tax exemption. The argument for redistributing 
resources through health care, rather than by directly transferring money 
to poor people, is that health care is a “merit” good. As with many of the 
efficiency arguments, this justification runs afoul of being inferior to more 
targeted policies. For example, Medicaid targets resources for the care of 
the poor much more directly than a property or income tax exemption. 
Thus far, we  have described theoretical arguments in favor of the tax 
exemption of NFP hospitals. Many of these arguments offer only weak 
support for the tax exemption since it is not directly tied to particular 
behaviors or desired outcomes. Claims justifying the tax exemptions for 
NFP hospitals based on the services they provide require that NFP hospi- 
tals are more likely than FP hospitals to produce the desired outputs. We 
address whether the different organizational forms produce different out- 
puts in the next section. 
Policies that benefit one organizational form over another often spur 
criticisms of “unfair competition.” Managers of FP hospitals claim that 
they are at a competitive disadvantage because the NFP hospitals are ex- 
empt from taxes. Presumably, these managers would support replacing the 
tax exemption with policies tied to specific behaviors but independent of 
organizational form. While such policies might be more effective from the 
government’s perspective for the reasons discussed above, the issue of un- 
fair competition is more complex than just noting that a policy favors one 
organizational form over another. 
First, the coexistence of two organizational forms providing similar ser- 
vices (though possibly not identical services) suggests that the alternative 
organizational  forms  have  competing  advantages  and   disadvantage^.^ 
While the NFP organizations may have tax and reputation advantages, 
the FP firms may have an edge in terms of access to equity capital or 
managerial efficiency (assuming the market for corporate control effec- 
tively disciplines FP managers). In addition, FP  hospitals may take advan- 
tage of opportunities for “cream skimming” either by specializing in high- 
profit activities or by catering to high-profit patients6  Thus, the mix of 
firms in the industry depends on the size of the tax advantage for NFP 
hospitals relative to these other differential costs and benefits of the two 
5. For a discussion of the merits of alternative organizational forms from an agency cost 
perspective, see Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b). Alternatively, the coexistence of the two 
organizational  forms could be  a disequilibrium phenomenon; however, despite the recent 
wave of conversions of NFP hospitals into FP hospitals, this explanation seems implausible 
given the persistence of the two forms. 
6. Myerson (1997) discusses the trend toward specialized hospitals “designed to conquer 
a profitable niche,” such as heart  hospitals and cancer centers. While he claims that  FP 
hospitals are more aggressive in seeking these opportunities, both organizational forms are 
participating in the trend. In addition, these specialty hospitals have increased the competi- 
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organizational  forms. Second,  Rose-Ackerman (1982)  argues that  the 
competition offered by NFP hospitals is “unfair” only if it is unanticipated 
and creates windfall losses for investors in the FP enterprises; FP firms 
should include anticipated competition from NFP firms in their invest- 
ment decisions, and hence, anticipated competition does not unduly bur- 
den  the  FP firms (though  it may  shift the composition  of  investment 
within the industry). 
9.3  Patterns in Location, Size, and Function of NFP and FP Hospitals 
Given the justifications for the tax exemption of NFP hospitals and the 
potential for unfair competition, we  present some basic facts about the 
size and characteristics of hospitals that are related to these hypotheses. 
Understanding differences in hospital characteristics is helpful for evalu- 
ating the tax benefits of NFP hospitals and for determining whether the 
organizational forms differ in their provision of community benefits. We 
focus on nonfederal, general short-term hospitals in the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia using data from cost reports submitted to the Health 
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) for fiscal year 1995 by hospitals 
participating in Medicare. 
Of these 4,996 short-term hospitals in the United States in 1995, 2,963 
(59 percent) are not for profit, 724 (15 percent) are for profit, and 1,309 
(26 percent) are governmental. As the NFP sector contains some very 
large teaching hospitals, nearly 70 percent (660,150) of beds are located 
in NFP hospitals. FP hospitals account for 12 percent (1 16,135) of beds, 
while  the government hospitals  account  for  the remaining  18  percent 
(169,680). 
9.3.1  Regional Differences 
The distribution of hospital types varies greatly by  geographic region. 
In the Northeast, the NFP sector dominates. Connecticut, Maine, New 
Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont do not have any FP hospitals, and in 
Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, the percentage of beds in 
for-profit control is under 3 percent. The government sector is also small 
in the Northeast; the percentage of hospital beds in the government sector 
is  less than  10 percent  in  every northeastern  state. In contrast  to  the 
Northeast, the percentage of hospital beds in the FP sector exceeds 30 
percent in seven states: Texas, Utah, Tennessee, Nevada, Florida, Dela- 
ware, and Louisiana. Nearly half (54,511) of  all for-profit hospital beds 
are in just three states: Texas, Florida, and California. 
Since hospital services are predominantly provided locally, the uneven 
geographic .distribution of  FP hospitals raises questions about how the 
different organizational forms interact. Obviously, in a market with no FP 
hospitals, the NFPs are insulated from competitive pressures induced by 292  William M. Gentry and John R. Penrod 
the potentially different objectives of FP  hospitals.’ At the other extreme, 
when FP hospitals have a large market share, they may be less able to 
exploit profit opportunities through segmenting the market since there are 
fewer NFP hospitals to serve the less-profitable patients. In general, the 
competitive interactions between organizational forms may depend on the 
market penetration of FP  hospitals. For example, the presence of a single 
FP  hospital in a market might not influence the behavior of the dominant 
NFP hospitals, but when FP firms have a large market share, the NFP 
hospitals might respond by  changing some behaviors. Since FP hospitals 
are unevenly distributed across locations, it is unlikely that a single, simple 
model will capture the interactions between FP  and NFP hospitals in these 
different markets. 
9.3.2  Differences in Size 
In table 9.1, we  present the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th 
percentile of the characteristics of the hospitals by control type. We sum- 
marize the data in this way to minimize the effect of what appear to be 
unrealistic values and to give an idea of the dispersion of the data as well 
as its central tendency. Panel A presents data on hospital size. At the 25th 
percentile, the NFP hospitals are smaller than the FP hospitals in terms 
of the total facility beds and the number of discharges, though the 25th 
percentile of the number of hospital employees is greater for NFP hospi- 
tals. At the median and the 75th percentile of the distributions, the NFP 
hospitals are larger than the FP  hospitals across all three dimensions. For 
example, the 75th percentile of the total facility beds is 50 percent larger 
for the NFP hospitals than for the FP hospitals, and the 75th percentile 
of the total number of employees is  109 percent larger. Across all three 
size measures, government hospitals are the smallest of the three types. 
For each size variable, a Kruskal-Wallis test of equivalence of the distribu- 
tion across hospital types is rejected at the 0.01 level. 
In panel B of table 9.1, we describe hospital size by financial measures. 
Across  all points  in  the  distribution,  NFP hospitals  have the  greatest 
amount of both fixed and total assets, followed by  FP and then govern- 
ment hospitals. NFP hospitals at the median and the 75th percentile gen- 
erate more net patient revenue than their FP counterparts, though at the 
25th percentile, net revenues of NFP hospitals lagged behind those of the 
FPs. Revenues of government hospitals are the lowest of the three types. 
Kruskal-Wallis tests for each of the variables presented in the middle panel 
rejected the null of equal distributions at the 0.01 level. 
7. Unless regulatory barriers prevent entry by FP hospitals, the NFP hospitals may be 
influenced by the threat of entry by FP  competition even where FP  hospitals have zero mar- 
ket share. Table 9.1  Hospital Characteristics by Type of Hospital Control 
25th Percentile  Median  75th Percentile 
NFP  FP  Gov  NFP  FP  Gov  NFP  FP  Gov  K-W Test 
A. Hospital size 
Total facility beds 
Total discharges 
Length of stay 
No. of employees 
B. Hospital  finances 
Total assets (lo6) 
Fixed assets (lo6) 
Net patient revenue 
Inpatient YO  total 
C. Types ofparients 
Medicaid % days 
Medicare % days 
Case mix index 
% ICU days 
(lo6) 
revenue 
81.0  86.5  42.0  1  70  138  70 
1,682  1,839  496  4,975  3,609  1,233 
4.53  4.32  4.32  5.51  5.11  5.46 
206  177  84  520  330  161 
11.34  9.43  3.37  40.7  22.4  8.04 
5.09  4.19  1.38  18.2  13.0  3.59 
12.03  13.30  3.75  37.2  28.4  8.04 
53.4  58.  I  47.7  62.4  66.9  56.6 
5.47  4.74  4.90  10.5  10.9  11.7 
36.5  39.9  20.9  51.8  52.4  49.9 
1.15  1.19  1 .oo  1.28  1.33  1.09 









































Source: Tabulation based on a sample of 4,996 general short-term hospitals from HCFA's public use file of Medicare cost reports, fiscal year 1995. 
*The Kruskal-Wallis test of equivalent distribution of the variable across the three hospital types was rejected at the 0.01 level. 294  William M. Gentry and John R. Penrod 
9.3.3  Characteristics and Complexity of Patients 
Panel C of table 9.1 presents measures of the kind and complexity of 
the patients treated in the three types of hospitals. The first two rows of 
this panel present the percentage  of patients insured  by  Medicaid  and 
Medicare, respectively. If government insurance programs offer less gener- 
ous reimbursement than private insurance, we  would expect that profit- 
maximizing firms might have an incentive to “cherry pick” or avoid the 
treatment of patients covered by this type of insurance. Though the advent 
of managed care has made Medicare patients relatively more attractive to 
hospitals than they were in the past, this is less true for Medicaid patients, 
and it seems remarkable that the percentage of patients in the two types 
of private hospitals should be so similar. The final two rows of table 9.1 
give some indication of the complexity of cases served by  each hospital 
type as measured by a case mix index (CMI) and the percentage of inpa- 
tient days that were in the intensive care unit.8 By these indices the FP 
hospitals tend to treat slightly more difficult cases than NFP   hospital^.^ 
9.3.4  Comparison of Services Provided 
As a result of different organizational objectives, tax benefits, differ- 
ences in regulatory constraints, or perhaps simply the historical evolution 
of the hospital market, hospitals of different organizational forms may dif- 
fer in the kind and intensity  of  services that they provide. We examine 
differences by  hospital type in the provision certain services, both those 
described in the literature as “community benefits” and those we classify 
as “specialized” services. 
Community Benefits 
As FP hospitals have grown in number, potential differences across hos- 
pital types in the willingness to provide uncompensated care has received 
much attention. The motivation for these concerns is clear: In the absence 
of harmful reputation effects, one would expect profit-maximizing firms to 
avoid treating uninsured patients, for whom receipt of payment is unlikely. 
Moreover, NFP firms are expected to provide a reasonable amount of un- 
compensated care in exchange for their tax-exempt status, though in most 
states the level of uncompensated care required to maintain NFP  status is 
vaguely specified. Although it is not possible to study these differences 
with the Medicare cost report data, which lack information on the provi- 
sion of uncompensated care, two recent  studies use data on California 
8. Higher values of HCFA’s CMI indicates a case load that is more expensive to treat. 
9. Alternatively, the difference in  CMI may come from FP hospitals systematically re- 
cording more difficult diagnoses than NFP hospitals for similar patients. This recording 
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hospitals to address this question. Norton and Staiger (1994) find that 
though NFP hospitals provide more uncompensated care, the difference 
between NFP and FP  firms disappears when accounting for the endogen- 
eity of the choice of  organizational form. In other words, their results 
indicate that NFP and FP hospitals located in areas with similar charac- 
teristics would offer similar amounts of uncompensated care. Their study 
underlines the importance of treating the organizational form as endoge- 
nous in order to make strong predictions related to the effects of the orga- 
nizational form on hospital behavior. Young, Desai, and Lukas (1997) find 
that uncompensated care in hospitals that underwent a transition  from 
NFP to FP did not decline relative to a control set of  NFP hospitals, 
though, consistent with Norton and Staiger (1994), the hospitals that were 
acquired had a lower baseline level of uncompensated,care. 
Using the Medicare cost report data, we present evidence on the pres- 
ence of three additional hospital services viewed as community benefits: 
an emergency department, a delivery room, and a hospital teaching pro- 
gram.I0  In our description of the differences in service provision below, we 
do not purport to provide estimates of a behavioral model that accounts 
for the endogeneity of  organization form. Rather, we  seek to provide a 
basic description of the differences, how they might be partially accounted 
for by  variables such as hospital size, and how this description is related 
to various hypotheses suggested by economic theory. We present statistics 
on these services in table 9.2. The first three columns of the table show the 
proportion of hospitals of each organizational form that provide the ser- 
vice or have the characteristic. In column 4,  we  present a chi-square statis- 
tic for the null  hypothesis of  equality in the proportion across organi- 
zational forms. Finally, column 5 reports whether statistical differences 
between  organizational  forms were  maintained  in  a  linear  probability 
model where the presence of the service or characteristic was modeled as 
a function of (1) a constant; (2) four hospital size indicators; and (3) indi- 
cators for  teaching status, government status, for-profit  status, church 
affiliation, and status as a sole community hospital. We  also included in- 
teractions of the two organizational form indicators with the four size indi- 
cators. 
The first row of table 9.2 presents results on the presence of emergency 
room services by hospital type.IL  Uninsured patients are more likely to use 
emergency rooms for routine medical care than insured patients and the 
10. The sample from the cost reports was limited to hospitals that reported “reasonable” 
values for total number of beds, number of  employees, employees per bed, total discharges, 
return on fixed assets, fixed assets per discharge, return on total assets, net revenue per day, 
length of stay, inpatient share of revenue, and average wages. 
11. As for each of the “service” variables, the emergency department variable is set to 1 if 
the hospital reported positive costs for the department. 296  William M. Gentry and John R. Penrod 
Table 9.2  Presence of Hospital ServiceslCharacteristics by  Organizational Form 
Percent with Service 
Regression 
NFP  FP  Gov  Chi-square  Results 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Emergency room  91.8  93.2  99.0  0.001  [I]" 
Delivery room  14.1  62.7  12.8  0.001  PI 
Teaching program  29.2  12.7  9.1  0.001  [I1 
ICU  19.6  81.3  52.8  0.001  111 
ccu  24.5  13.2  10.8  0.001  PIb 
Radiation therapy unit  24.4  10.5  9.9  0.001  PI 
Source: Based on the sample from Medicare cost reports for fiscal year 1995. 
Note:  Columns 1, 2, and 3 show percentages for each service by hospital type, and column 
4 gives the chi-square for the test of equality of the proportions across organizational forms. 
Column 5 indicates where there were differences across organization forms in a linear proba- 
bility model where the provision of the service is modeled as a function of a constant; four 
hospital size indicators; and indicators for teaching status, government status, for-profit sta- 
tus, church affiliation, and status as a sole community hospital. The two organizational form 
indicators were interacted with the four size indicators. 
"[I]  indicates significant differences across organizational forms for some hospital sizes; see 
text. 
b[2]  indicates no significant differences across organizational forms for any hospital sue. 
emergency department is a port of entry for hospital admission for more 
seriously ill  uninsured  patients.I2 Therefore, it  is  possible that  profit- 
seeking hospital firms would seek to avoid providing these services. In the 
first three columns of table 9.2, we show the proportions of the three types 
of hospitals with an emergency department. Consistent with our expecta- 
tions, 93 percent of FP hospitals provide emergency services, compared 
to 98 percent of NFP and 99 percent of government hospitals. The chi- 
square statistic indicates that the proportions are statistically significant. 
Controlling for potential confounding factors in  the regression model, 
small FP  hospitals (those with less than 75 beds) are 18 percentage points 
(p  value of 0.0001) less likely to have an emergency room than their NFP 
counterparts, and FP hospitals with between 150 and 225 beds are 5.5 
percentage points less likely to provide emergency services than their NFP 
counterparts. There are no statistically significant differences between FP 
and NFP hospitals with between 75  and  150 beds or between FP and 
NFP hospitals with more than 300 beds. 
For reasons analogous to that for emergency rooms, profit-maximizing 
hospital firms might avoid the provision of newborn deliveries in order to 
avoid expending resources on births to uninsured or Medicaid-insured 
young mothers, especially since uninsured women are more likely to have 
12. For example, Culhane and Hadley (1992) find that NFP  psychiatric hospitals are more 
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low birth weight children that could require expensive neonatal care.13 In 
the second row of  table 9.2, we  present some statistics for provision of 
hospital delivery rooms by hospital type. Sixty-three  percent of FP  hospi- 
tals provide delivery services, compared to 73 percent of government and 
75 percent of NFP hospitals. In the regression analysis, statistically sig- 
nificant differences between FP and NFP firms are present for the two 
smallest size categories. Relative to similarly sized NFP hospitals, FP  hos- 
pitals with fewer than 75 beds are 28 percentage points less likely to have 
delivery services, and FP  hospitals with between 75 and 150 beds are eight 
percentage points less likely to provide delivery services. 
The future of hospital-based medical education programs in increas- 
ingly competitive hospital markets has been the subject of much discus- 
sion (see, for example, Reuter and Gaskin  1997). Culhane and Hadley 
(1992) show that NFP psychiatric hospitals are more likely to be involved 
in professional training than FP psychiatric hospitals. The third row of 
table 9.2 presents statistics for the presence of a teaching program in our 
sample of  short-term general  hospital^.'^ Twenty-nine percent of  NFP 
hospitals have a teaching program, while only 12.7 percent of FP and 9.1 
percent of government hospitals do. The regression analysis reveals that 
teaching status is very strongly related to size, and organizational form 
does not influence the probability of having a teaching program for hospi- 
tals with fewer than 150 beds. However, among the three largest categories, 
there were important (and statistically significant) differences between FP 
and NFP firms in the probability of having a teaching program. FP  hospi- 
tals with between 150 and 224 beds were 16  percentage points less likely 
to have a teaching program. For hospitals with between 225 and 299 beds 
and hospitals with more than 300 beds, the differences were 29  and 36 
percentage points, respectively. 
Provision of  Specialized Services 
In rows 4 through 6 of table 9.2, we  present statistics on the presence of 
three specialized service units: an intensive care unit (ICU), a coronary 
care unit (CCU), and a radiation therapy unit (RTU). We  find that FP 
hospitals, perhaps surprisingly, are the most likely to have an ICU (83 
percent), followed by NFP (78 percent) and government hospitals (50 per- 
cent). The regressions indicate that the statistically significant differences 
across organizational forms are concentrated in the smallest two hospital 
size categories. For the CCUs, NFP hospitals lead, with 24.5 percent hav- 
ing a CCU, with the proportions being 13.2 percent and 10.8 percent in 
FP and government hospitals, respectively. However, having a CCU is 
13. Haas et al. (1993) describe differences in birth outcomes between insured and unin- 
14. We classify hospitals as teaching hospitals if they indicated the presence of interns and 
sured women in Massachusetts. 
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strongly associated with size and teaching status, and in the regression 
analysis, none of the indicators for organizational form or their interac- 
tions with the size indicators were statistically significant. The results for 
the RTUs are somewhat different, though the pattern of the raw propor- 
tions look similar to those of the CCUs, with 24.4 percent of NFPs, 10.5 
percent of FPs, and 9.9 percent of  government hospitals having RTU 
units. The regression reveals that the presence of a RTU is very strongly 
associated with size and teaching status. Once these are controlled for, 
there is no statistical difference between government and NFP hospitals. 
For the three smallest hospital size categories, there is no difference be- 
tween FP and NFP hospitals, but there is a significant difference for the 
two highest categories. For example, a NFP hospital with more than 300 
beds is 18 percentage points more likely, other things equal, to have an 
RTU than its FP counterpart. 
These systematic differences in the outputs of FP and NFP hospitals 
may offer some justification for the tax exemptions for NFP hospitals if 
society values these differences and, for some reason, the FP organiza- 
tional form underprovides these services. These differences  in services may, 
in part, explain the differences in profitability that we  document in the 
next section. However, the story of service differences  across organizational 
form is complicated by  the significant amount of within-organizational- 
form variation. For example, as defined by Clement, Smith, and Wheeler 
(1994), 20-80  percent of NFP hospitals do not provide a level of commu- 
nity benefit equal to the government’s tax expenditure on them, and Cul- 
hane and Hadley (1992) find in their discriminant analysis that, based on 
the services provided and clientele served by  their sample of psychiatric 
hospitals, some NFP psychiatric hospitals appear more like their FP  coun- 
terparts than like the other NFP psychiatric hospitals. 
9.4  The Exemption from Capital Taxes 
A major portion of the tax advantage of NFP hospitals comes from the 
exemption from factor taxes on capital-the  corporate income tax and 
the property tax. We begin this section by discussing general issues in an- 
alyzing factor taxes. We follow this general framework with imputations 
of the aggregate value of the exemption from income and property taxes 
and the heterogeneity in these benefits across hospitals. 
9.4.1  General Issues in Analyzing Factor Taxes 
Since the property tax and income tax are taxes on capital, the impor- 
tance of the exemption from these taxes depends on how much capital 
hospitals use. To  get an idea of the importance of capital for hospitals, 
table 9.3 compares the capital intensity of publicly traded FP hospitals 
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Table 9.3  Hospital Capital Intensity and Profitability Relative to Other 
Industries, 1995 
Industry 
Wages to  Net PPE  Return on 
Net PPE  to Sales  Assets (%) 
Natural resources  0.292  0.864  6.8 
Transportation and utilities  0.313  1.157  8.4 
Sales  0.402  0.182  8.7 
Services  2.022  0.412  9.1 
Hospitals  0.724  0.608  10.3 
Manufacturing  0.391  0.360  10.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database. 
Note: The values are industry averages weighted by  the size of the denominator (i.e., the sum 
of all firms’ values for the numerator divided by the sum of all firms’ values for the denomina- 
tor). Net PPE is the net book value of property, plant, and equipment. The labor expense 
measure is missing for many firms. 
STAT, a database of corporate financial statements. While the publicly 
traded firms may  differ from their privately held or NFP competitors, 
these data are useful for making interindustry comparisons. Furthermore, 
the eight publicly traded firms with primary Standard Industrial Classifi- 
cation (SIC) code 8062 own the majority of for-profit h0spita1s.I~  The table 
reports two measures of capital intensity-wages  divided by the net book 
value of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) as an approximation of 
ratio of labor-to-capital inputs, and the net book value of PPE divided by 
sales revenue as an approximation of the capital-to-output ratio. 
In terms of the labor-to-capital ratios, hospitals appear much more la- 
bor intensive than firms in nonservice industries (a ratio of 0.72 for hospi- 
tals compared to 0.39 for manufacturing firms).I6  While these data indicate 
that hospitals are relatively labor intensive in terms of factor proportions 
of capital and labor, hospitals are in the middle of all firms in terms of 
asset-to-sales ratios. That the manufacturing sector has both low wage-to- 
asset and low asset-to-sales ratios suggests that material inputs play a 
larger role in manufacturing than in service industries, such as hospitals. 
Overall, the data offer some evidence that hospitals are relatively labor 
intensive and, therefore, would benefit less from a capital tax exemption 
than would firms in other industries. 
15. According to the Directory of  Investor-Owned Hospitals, Hospital Management Compa- 
nies, and Health Systems, the eight publicly traded companies in the sample own 562 of the 
740 (76.0 percent) nonspecialty investor-owned hospitals, which account for 101,879 of the 
120,620 (84.5 percent) beds in these hospitals. For 1995, Hospital Statistics (from the Ameri- 
can Hospital Association’s annual survey) reports 752 for-profit community hospitals with a 
total of 106,000 beds. 
16. The wage data include hospital employees but not payments made directly from pa- 
tients to doctors, so they probably understate the relative labor intensity of health care ser- 
vices. For the manufacturing sector, a large fraction of the firms do not report the wage data. 300  William M. Gentry  and John R. Penrod 
While the corporate income and property taxes are both factor taxes on 
capital, the differences in their administration leads to crucial differences 
in how important the tax exemption may be for NFP hospitals. The corpo- 
rate income tax is levied on the flow of income generated by  the firm’s 
assets; in contrast, the property tax applies to the stock of assets owned 
by the firm. For a given rate of return, it is possible to construct a property 
tax that has the same revenue as a tax on capital income (assuming that 
the property tax applies to all of the capital generating the income). For 
example, for a 10 percent return to capital, a 30 percent capital income 
tax raises the same revenue as a 3 percent property tax. 
Several details of the actual tax systems affect the equivalence between 
income and property taxes. First, property taxes sometimes only apply to 
a subset of the firm’s assets, such as land and structures. Second, for the 
corporate income tax, the returns that flow to bondholders do not face 
corporate taxation since interest expense is deductible. Third, since the 
income tax is an ex post capital tax, any returns generated as inframarginal 
returns (economic profit) or from good or bad luck are included in the tax 
base. Similarly, the income tax depends on the profitability of the manage- 
ment of the assets. If the firm chooses to deploy the assets in ways that are 
less profitable than it could otherwise use the assets, then it will pay less 
in income taxes for a given amount of assets; however, the property tax 
levy is not sensitive to these decisions. The same argument applies if man- 
agement deploys the assets less efficiently. This difference in taxes is espe- 
cially relevant if  NFP hospitals provide less-profitable services that have 
unmeasured (from the perspective of the tax base) social benefits. 
Since the income tax uses an ex post measure of the return to capital, 
the tax liability depends on the profitability of the firm. The third column 
of table 9.3 provides a simple comparison of the profitability of publicly 
traded hospitals relative to other sectors. The 10.3 percent return on assets 
for publicly traded hospitals in  1995 is similar to the return on assets in 
manufacturing (10.2 percent) and higher than the returns in the other sec- 
tors. For the period 1978 through 1995, hospitals had an average return 
on assets of 11.5 percent. These returns suggest that an exemption from a 
capital income tax could have substantial value for hospitals. 
While the comparisons of the publicly traded FP  hospitals with firms in 
other industries provide a useful benchmark for thinking about the magni- 
tude of the tax break for hospitals relative to the tax liabilities in other 
industries, this sample of firms may not reflect the value to NFP hospitals. 
As discussed above, the organizational forms differ in their outputs. They 
may also differ in terms of their reliance on capital and their profitabil- 
ity. In terms of their reliance on capital, two potentially offsetting effects 
might lead to differences in input choices across organizational forms. 
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more capital-intensive  production methods or specialize in more capital- 
intensive outputs.” Second, since NFP hospitals cannot issue public eq- 
uity, they may use less capital than FP hospitals. To compare the two types 
of hospitals, we return to the Medicare cost report data. 
Table 9.4 compares the capital intensity and profitability of different 
types of hospitals. We have five measures of capital intensity: (1) employ- 
ees per bed; (2) wages to fixed assets; (3) fixed assets to net patient revenue; 
(4) fixed assets per discharge; and (5) allocated capital costs as a fraction 
of total allocated costs. While the nonparametric statistical tests reject the 
null hypothesis that the distributions of the capital intensity variables are 
drawn from a common distribution, there are no strong patterns in capital 
intensity across types of hospitals. The distributions of the capital intensi- 
ties have considerable overlap indicating that high capital intensity is not 
associated with a particular organizational form. At the median of their 
distributions, NFP hospitals have more employees per bed (3.30 for NFP 
hospitals to 2.44 for FP hospitals), higher wages relative to fixed assets 
(0.92 to 0.74), and lower capital costs relative to total costs (0.09 to 0.107). 
These differences suggest that NFP hospitals are less capital intensive than 
the FP hospitals. However, in terms of fixed assets relative to net patient 
revenues or discharges, NFP hospitals appear slightly more capital inten- 
sive than FP hospitals. 
The second panel of the table compares the profitability of different 
types of hospitals. Our measures of profitability are: (1) net income; (2) re- 
turn on assets (total income divided by total assets); (3)  return on fixed 
assets (the difference between patient revenue and operating expenses di- 
vided by fixed assets); and (4)  operating margins (net patient revenues less 
operating expenses divided by operating expenses). The government hos- 
pitals are clearly less profitable than the private hospitals. By  all of the 
measures except net income, the NFP hospitals are less profitable than the 
FP hospitals. The median of the return on fixed asset distribution for NFP 
hospitals is zero compared to 10.4  percent for FP  hospitals; the low return 
on assets suggests that the NFP hospitals might pay considerably less in 
income taxes than their FP counterparts. However, the different organiza- 
tional forms are much more similar in terms of returns on total assets; one 
difference between the return on fixed assets and the return on total assets 
is the investment income earned on investments, an important source of 
income for NFP hospitals with large endowments. 
The lower incomes of NFP hospitals are consistent with both of the 
17. The idea of one organizational form specializing  in a particular set of outputs depends 
on the coexistence of the two organizational forms within the same geographic market. For 
markets served only by NFP hospitals, one would expect that only the substitution  of capital 
for labor for a given set of outputs would occur, since without an FP competitor, changing 
outputs implies changing the overall set of services received by  the community. Table 9.4  Capital Intensity and Profitability by Type of Hospital Control 
25th Percentile  Median  75th Percentile 
NFP  FP  Gov  NFP  FP  Gov  NFP  FP  Gov  K-W Test 
A. Capital Intensity 
Employees per bed  2.42  1.87  1.66  3.30  2.44  2.44  4.16  3.09  3.50  * 
Wages to fixed assets  0.68  0.50  0.76  0.92  0.74  1.08  1.29  1.29  1.63 
Fixed assets to net patient 
revenue  0.35  0.28  0.30  0.47  0.45  0.42  0.61  0.65  0.59 
Fixed assets per discharge  2,623  1,913  2,028  3,852  3,522  3,204  5,444  5,721  5,030 
Capital costs over total 
costs  0.070  0.083  0.053  0.090  0.107  0.070  0.113  0.133  0.091 
B. Profitability 





Return on assets (YO)  1.1  -0.6  -0.5  4.4  6.9  4.2  7.9  19.3  4.9 
Return on fixed assets (“YO)  -9.3  -4.6  -31.5  0.0  10.4  -7.0  8.3  34.4  4.9 
* 
* 
Operating margin (YO)  -4.2  -2.7  -12.0  -0.0  5.2  -3.3  4.1  16.8  2.4  * 
Source: Tabulation based on a sample of 4,996 general short-term hospitals from HCFA‘s public use file of Medicare cost reports, fiscal year 1995. 
*The Kruskal-Wallis test of equivalent distribution of  the variable across the three hospital types was rejected at the 0.01 level. The Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Hospitals  303 
competing theories stated above. Consistent with the intent of  the NFP 
tax exemption, the NFPs could be distributing some of  their “income” 
in the form of community benefits, or services provided at a price below 
average cost. Alternatively, the lower incomes could come from adminis- 
trative inefficiency or excessive payments to factors of production. The 
lower incomes of the NFP hospitals may also reflect random differences 
across firms and years. Our analysis of cost report data focuses on 1995 
when FP hospitals happened to be more profitable than NFP hospitals. 
While this difference is common, in some years, the different organiza- 
tional forms have similar profitability (see Sloan 1997).18 Thus, our com- 
parisons of NFP and FP hospitals are somewhat sensitive to the choice 
of year. 
These univariate comparisons of capital intensity and profitability do 
not control for other hospital characteristics, such as size and teaching 
responsibilities, that are correlated with organizational form. To control 
for some of these factors, we  regress our measures of capital intensity and 
profitability on the number of beds in the facility and dummy variables 
for for-profit status, government ownership, church affiliation, rural loca- 
tion (sole community hospital status), and teaching (as proxied for by the 
presence of interns or residents). Table 9.5 presents the results from these 
descriptive regressions. In terms of capital intensity, a more clear picture 
emerges that FP are more capital intensive than NFP hospitals: On aver- 
age, relative to NFP hospitals, the FP hospitals have 0.6 fewer employees 
per bed, 0.06 higher fixed-asset-to-revenue ratios, $838 more fixed assets 
per discharge, and 0.023 higher capital costs as a fraction of total COS~S.’~ 
If, as suggested by the regressions, NFP hospitals are less capital intensive 
than FP hospitals, then the value of the NFPs’ exemption from capital 
taxes is less than the value of taxes paid by the FP  hospitals. Furthermore, 
these regressions cast doubt on the hypothesis that the exemption from 
capital taxes leads the NFP hospitals to substitute capital for labor or to 
specialize in more capital-intensive forms of health care. 
The regression results on profitability confirm the conclusions from ta- 
ble 9.4 that FP  hospitals are more profitable than NFP hospitals. Relative 
to the NFP hospitals, the FP hospitals have $1.3 million more in net in- 
come, a 5.4 percentage point higher return on assets, a 15 percentage point 
higher return on fixed assets, and a 7.9 percentage point higher operating 
18. While Sloan’s analysis of total margins shows that FP and NFP hospitals are similar 
in some years, Cleverly’s (1992) comparison of the return on equity of hospital systems indi- 
cates that FP hospital chains typically outperform NFP hospitals. 
19. For the variables created from accounting measures of capital (either fixed assets or 
allocated capital costs), newer hospitals may have higher measured capital costs than older 
hospitals if  depreciation allowances for accounting purposes are more generous than true 
economic depreciation. With accelerated  depreciation, book values of capital will understate 
market values. If hospital age is correlated with organizational form, then these discrepancies 
could affect our results. Table 9.5  Capital Intensity and Profitability Regressions 
Explanatory Variable 
Beds 
Constant  (thousands)  For Profit  Government  Church  Rural  Teaching 
Employees per bed 
Wages to fixed assets 
Fixed assets to net patient 
Fixed assets per discharge 
Capital costs over total 
Net income (000) 
Return on assets (%) 
Return on fixed assets (“A) 

































































-  1.9** 
Source: The sample includes 4,555 general short-term hospitals from HCFA’s public use file of Medicare cost reports, fiscal year 1995. 
Note: Relative to the sample in tables 9.1, 9.2, and 9.4, we eliminated observations with implausible values. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level The Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Hospitals  305 
margin. The results also indicate that larger hospitals are more profitable 
(both in terms of the level of income and the rate of return), government 
hospitals are less profitable than NFP hospitals, and teaching hospitals 
are less profitable than other hospitals (in terms of rates of return). Over- 
all, these differences in  profitability suggest that many NFP hospitals 
would not have large income tax liabilities since they are not profitable. 
9.4.2  The Value of the Exemption from Income Taxes 
As a starting point for analyzing the importance of the income tax ex- 
emption for NFP hospitals, we examine the income tax liabilities of pub- 
licly traded FP  hospitals, the same sample we used in table 9.3 to compare 
capital intensity across industries. Table 9.6 presents summary measures 
of the importance of income taxes over time for publicly traded hospitals 
and across industries for  1995. For  1995, publicly traded hospitals re- 
ported $976 million in total income taxes.zo  Hospitals’ tax liabilities have 
grown over time as the FP hospital sector has grown. Compared to earlier 
years, 1995 seems typical in terms of income taxes relative to assets, sales, 
and cost of goods sold. Relative to manufacturing firms, income taxes are 
a slightly higher fraction of hospital assets, sales, and cost of goods sold. 
Since NFP hospitals may differ in terms of capital intensity and profit- 
ability, applying the taxes paid by  the FP hospitals may not be a good 
indicator of the taxes that the NFP hospitals would pay if the income tax 
exemption were repealed. To  get a sense of the potential tax liabilities of 
the NFP hospitals, we impute income tax liabilities from the HCFA cost 
report data. As an approximation of federal income taxes, we  multiply 
each hospital’s net income by 35 percent, the top corporate statutory mar- 
ginal tax rate. For firms with negative net income, this imputation leads 
to a tax “refund.” This refund can be used to offset income tax liability 
from either previous years (a carryback), future years (a carryforward), or 
other hospitals “owned” by the same taxable entityz1  To calculate precise 
estimates of the value of the refunds associated with losses requires a com- 
plicated, dynamic program accounting for the probability of firms moving 
from positive to negative income in order to use their carryforwards. Our 
approach overstates the value of tax refunds to the extent that some NFP 
hospitals persistently have negative income. To incorporate state income 
tax rates, we  include the top marginal state corporate income tax rate, 
20. These data are the income taxes reported for financial reporting purposes. They may 
differ from tax payments to the government due to differences in financial and tax account- 
ing. For example, differences in the timing of depreciation allowances can affect the taxes 
reported in financial statements relative to actual payments. 
21. The ability to offset losses against income of affiliated hospitals is obviously useful for 
the large FP hospital chains. However, most NFP hospitals are in relatively small groups. 
The repeal of the NFP income tax exemption would create incentives for NFP hospitals to 
consolidate in order to benefit from taxable losses generated by a single hospital. Table 9.6  Summary Measures of the Importance of Income Taxes for Publicly Traded Hospitals 
Income Taxes to Book  Income Taxes  Incomes Taxes to 
Number  Income Taxes  Value of Assets  to Sales  Cost of Goods Sold 
Year  of Firms  (Total in $millions)  (”/)  (“4  (%) 
1980  11  196  4.2  4.8  6.1 
1985  17  620  3.3  4.4  5.6 
1990  17  39 1  1.6  1.8  2.2 
1994  12  926  2.9  3.9  4.8 
1995  8  976  3.0  3.8  4.6 
Cross-Industry Comparison  for 1995 
Manufacturing  3,218  162,162  2.9  3.0  4.3 
Services  1,143  9,826  2.7  3.3  5.5 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database supplemented with Tenet Healthcare’s 1996  Annual Report. 
Note:  The ratios reflect total industry income taxes to industry book value, sales, and cost of goods sold. The Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Hospitals  307 
Table 9.7  Imputed Income Taxes by Type of Hospital Control 
25th Percentile  Median  75th Percentile 
NFP  FP  NFP  FP  NFP  FP 
Federal income tax 
(thousands)  68.7  -3.5  514.5  583.3  1,861.6  2,135.4 
Federal income tax 
to net patient 
revenue  0.47  -0.038  1.7  2.2  3.1  5.1 
Federal income tax 
to total assets  0.46  -0.017  1.5  2.5  2.7  6.4 
Total income tax 
(thousands)  79.2  -3.8  579.8  642.5  2,110.8  2,329.9 
Total income tax 
to net patient 
revenue  0.54  -0.044  1.9  2.5  3.5  5.6 
Total income tax 
to total assets  0.52  -0.017  1.8  2.7  3.1  7.1 
Source: Data are from HCFA's  public use file of Medicare cost reports, fiscal year 1995. 
Note: The ratios of taxes to revenue and assets are expressed as percentages. We  eliminated 
observations for which the return on assets or the return on fixed  assets was greater than 
one in absolute value. 
adjusted for deductibility of state income taxes for federal income tax pur- 
poses.22 
Table 9.7 reports statistics on the imputed value of income taxes paid 
by  NFP and FP hospitals, and the relative values of income taxes to net 
patient revenue and total asset value. We  include the FP hospitals as a 
comparison for the NFP hospitals; unfortunately, the cost report data do 
not include a variable for taxes paid. The imputations for the FP hospitals 
also allow us to compare our imputed tax liabilities with the reported tax 
liabilities of publicly traded hospitals in table 9.6. The eight hospital firms 
in table 9.6 owned 562 hospitals and record $976 million in income taxes 
paid. For the 622 FP hospitals in our sample, we  impute an aggregate 
income tax liability of $946 million, which suggests that our simple impu- 
tation does a reasonable  job of capturing income tax liabilities. 
While the median dollar values of federal income taxes are similar for 
the two types of firms ($514.5 for NFP hospitals compared to $583.3 for 
FP hospitals), much of this difference comes from differences in hospital 
size. In terms of income taxes relative to revenues or total assets, the me- 
dian values for NFP hospitals are roughly two-thirds as large as the me- 
22. We use state corporate tax rates from SigniJicant  Features of Fiscal Federalism. Since 
the last version of Signi9cant Features of Fiscal Federalism has data for 1993, we update this 
data with information from the Federation of Tax Administrators. 308  William M. Gentry and John  R. Penrod 
dian values for FP hospitals. Since the NFP hospitals have lower (private) 
rates of return than the FP  hospitals, they benefit less from the income tax 
exemption than would be expected by  simply assuming that they would 
pay a similar share of net revenue or asset value in income taxes as the FP 
hospitals. Without the tax exemption, the median NFP hospital would 
pay income taxes of 1.9 percent of net patient revenues; in contrast, the 
median FP hospital pays income taxes of 2.5 percent of net patient reve- 
nues. If the repeal of the income tax exemption pushes the NFP hospitals 
to behave like the current FP  hospitals, then the 2.5 percent represents the 
tax savings for NFP hospitals. The comparison of the value of the tax 
exemption with revenues suggests that the tax exemption provides consid- 
erable financial resources to undertake the NFPs’ charitable mission. For 
the 2,801 NFP hospitals in our sample, the aggregate imputed income tax 
liability is $4.6 billion, with roughly $4.1 billion resulting from the federal 
income tax exemption and the remaining $500 million from the state tax 
exemption. 
We impute the potential income tax liability by applying the tax rate to 
total net income, which is the sum of  operating income and investment 
income. Unlike FP  hospitals, some NFP  hospitals have substantial endow- 
ments invested in financial assets. Thus, the NFP hospital is a combination 
of an operating business with a hospital and a portfolio of financial assets. 
In aggregate, the exemption from income taxes on investment income ac- 
counts for $1.4 billion of the total value of the exemption from income 
taxes, which is 30 percent of the total value of the income tax exemption. 
The value of the tax exemption on investment income is concentrated 
among hospitals with large endowments. For an NFP hospital with zero 
(or negative) operating income but an endowment yielding investment in- 
come, the income tax exemption only has value because the hospital is a 
tax-exempt investor in financial assets. 
9.4.3  The Value of Exemption from Property Taxes 
Based on data provided by  hospitals for the fiscal year  1992, HCFA 
undertook a special project to analyze property tax payments by FP  hos- 
pitals. HCFAs data indicate that the average amount paid in property 
taxes by FP hospitals in 1992 was 1.6 percent of fixed assets. We use this 
rate as our first estimate of the average property tax rate that would apply 
to NFP hospitals in the absence of the tax exemption. We apply this rate 
to the fixed assets of NFP hospitals in the 1995 cost report data and report 
summary statistics on the value of the tax exemption in table 9.8.  The 
median hospital-level exemption is $295,139; the median exemption per 
bed is $1,769; the median exemption per discharge is $62; and the median 
exemption as a percentage of total revenues is 0.7 percent. 
There are several potential problems with the above calculations as esti- 
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Table 9.8  Imputed Property Taxes for NFP  Hospitals in Total and for Three States 
% Tax Rate  Property  Property  Property  Property 
on Fixed  Tax  Tax per  Tax per  Tax % Net 
Assets  Level  Bed  Discharge  Revenue 
25th percentile 
New Jersey  1.36  358,704 
Ohio  1.46  151,988 
Wisconsin  2.37  125,990 
United Statesa  1.60  82,357 
New Jersey  1.62  649,414 
Ohio  1.70  429,901 
Wisconsin  2.81  277,397 
United Statesa  1.60  295,139 
New Jersey  1.82  1,016,505 
Ohio  1.91  819,896 
Wisconsin  3.28  773,765 
United Statesa  1.60  721,766 
New Jersey  $64.34 million 
Ohio  $1 17.86 million 
Wisconsin  $83.66 million 
United States  $1.705 billion 
Median 
75th percentile 





































Source:  Tabulations compiled from Medicare cost reports report on fixed assets and state tabulations 
on property tax rates. 
W.S. property taxes are based on a rate of  1.6 percent, the percentage of fixed assets paid in property 
taxes by  hospitals paying property taxes, 1992. 
firms and NFP firms may systematically locate in areas with different tax 
rates, so that the rate of 1.6 percent, developed from a set of FP  hospitals, 
may not be an appropriate rate to apply to NFP hospitals. In particular, 
FP firms may locate in areas where property taxes are low. In addition, 
the uniform rate does not provide information on the heterogeneity in the 
tax rates and in the value of the exemption. For this reason, we  expand 
our analysis to individual states. 
Since there is no nationwide database providing the effective commer- 
cial property tax rates for each municipality, we set out to build our own 
by contacting the treasury departments in a large number of states. Three 
states-New  Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin-provided  efective  tax rates for 
each municipality in the state.23  Since FP hospitals represented a negli- 
23. The Office of Revenue and Tax Analysis of the Michigan Department of Revenue has 
recently published a set of imputations of the value of the tax exemption for NFP hospitals 
in Michigan (Michigan Department of Treasury 1997). They reported that property taxes 
represented 45.2 percent of Michigan’s $390.2 million in tax expenditures for not-for-profit 
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gible part of the market in these three states in 1995, we cannot adequately 
address the question of whether property tax rates “faced” by  FP and 
NFP firms are systematically different. However, our data from these 
states will give us some idea of the intrastate heterogeneity in the value of 
the tax exemption. 
Our three states differ in the classification of fixed assets that are taxed. 
In Ohio, real property (land and buildings) is taxed at a different rate than 
business personal property (movable equipment, etc.), and in New Jersey 
only real property is taxed. Since the Medicare cost report data do not 
provide separate variables for real and business personal property, we use 
the information on capital cost of  buildings and fixtures and movable 
equipment to determine the percentage of fixed assets in each of the two 
property categories. In each state, the property rate shows a fair amount 
of variation. Combining data from the Medicare cost reports and property 
tax rate data on the municipalities in which the hospitals reside, we calcu- 
late what the property tax bill of the NFP hospitals would have been had 
they not been exempt from taxation. 
Results from the property tax imputations for NFP hospitals are given 
in table 9.8. We report the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th per- 
centiles for five measures of the property tax burden. The tax rate for the 
median hospital in each of the three states is higher than the national 
average for FP  hospitals. For New Jersey, the difference is slight (1.62 per- 
cent versus 1.6 percent), but in Wisconsin, the median is 2.8 percent, 75 
percent higher than the FP national average. In addition to the interstate 
heterogeneity, tax rates vary considerably within states. For example, in 
Wisconsin the 25th percentile tax rate is 2.37 percent, while the 75th per- 
centile tax rate is 3.28 percent, an increase of  40 percent. Property tax 
levels move through a larger range, since this is largely a function of hospi- 
tal size. Indeed, the Michigan Department of Treasury (1997) calculates 
that the 10 largest of the 172 NFP hospitals in Michigan account for over 
40 percent of Michigan property tax expenditures. Columns 3, 4, and 5 
present the imputed property taxes in ways that account for hospital size. 
In column 3, we can see that, at the median, property taxes per bed ranged 
from $1,848 in Ohio, which is just slightly above the median for the coun- 
try as a whole ($1,769), to $2,945 in Wisconsin. Column 4 shows that the 
median imputed property tax per discharge ranged from $57 in New Jer- 
sey to $126 in Wisconsin, which is more than double the U.S. median of 
$62. In column 5 we  see that, as a percentage of revenues, the median 
property tax ranged from 0.6 percent in New Jersey to 1.4 percent in Wis- 
consin. 
At the bottom of table 9.8, we calculate the total property tax expendi- 
ture for general short-term NFP hospitals in the three states. The tax ex- 
penditure ranges from $64 million in New Jersey to $1 18 million in Ohio. 
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hospitals in these three states represent those faced by  NFP hospitals 
around the country, we use the average FP hospital property tax rate de- 
veloped from the HCFA study to develop a nationwide estimate of the 
value of the property tax exemption. By  this measure, the total property 
tax expenditure in the United States for fiscal year 1995 was $1.7 billion, 
As a proportion of capital tax exemptions given to NFP hospitals by state 
and local government, this property tax bill is three times the size of the 
$500 million we calculated as the value of the exemption from state cor- 
porate income taxes. The much higher federal corporate income taxes re- 
sult in a high value of the federal corporate income tax exemption ($4.1 
billion), even at the relatively low level of profitability of NFP hospitals. 
Thus, the value of the property tax exemption represents only 27 percent 
of the total 6.3 billion dollars of capital tax exemptions at all levels of gov- 
ernment. 
The relative size of the different types of assets also affects the value of 
the property tax and income tax exemptions. The income tax exemption 
excludes income generated both by  assets employed in the provision of 
medical care and investment assets, but the property tax only applies to 
fixed assets (or a subset of fixed assets). From table 9.1 we can see that, at 
the median, nonfixed assets represent the majority of the assets of NFP 
hospitals. Since property taxes are based only on fixed assets, the value of 
the property tax exemption, at the median, applies to less than half of all 
hospital assets. 
9.4.4  The Combined Value of Capital Tax Exemptions 
How large is the value of the capital tax exemption relative to govern- 
ment budgets and other tax expenditures directed to the health care sec- 
tor? If the tax exemption were abolished, how large would the revenue 
gain be relative to, say, the health care needs of the uninsured? In 1994, 
aggregate property taxes paid in the United States were $197 billion and 
aggregate corporate income taxes were  $169 billion (US. Bureau of  the 
Census  1997, table 478). Thus, with our assumption of no behavioral 
changes by the NFP hospitals, the $6.3 billion capital tax exemptions ($1.7 
billion in property tax exemptions and $4.6 billion in income tax exemp- 
tions) extended to NFP hospitals represent about 1.7 percent of property 
and corporate income taxes paid.24  Compared to other tax expenditures 
in the health care sector, the capital tax exemption for NFP hospitals is 
much smaller than the $60.6 billion tax expenditure on the exclusion of 
employer contributions for medical insurance, but it is larger than the $3.7 
billion for deductibility of medical expenses and the $2.2 billion for de- 
24. As we discuss below, our calculations are based on the assumption of  static reaction 
of hospitals to the capital taxes. It is possible that the NFP hospitals could obtain profitabil- 
ity levels similar to FP hospitals in an environment where they are taxed. 312  William M. Gentry and John R. Penrod 
ductibility of charitable contributions to the health care sector (U.S. Bu- 
reau of the Census 1995, table 523). 
In 1995, approximately 41 million people in the United States lacked 
health insurance. Hence, the value of the capital tax exemption to NFP 
hospitals represents $154 for each uninsured person. In 1995, per capita 
hospitalization expenses totaled $1,283?  Assuming that the uninsured 
have hospitalization costs similar to the national average and that hospital 
output and prices are not sensitive to tax policy, then the extra tax revenue 
generated by taxing NFP hospitals could fund 12 percent of a program to 
extend hospitalization insurance to the uninsured. 
9.5  Access to Tax-Exempt Bond Markets 
The ability to borrow using tax-exempt bonds is another potential tax- 
related advantage for NFP hospitals. In this section, we address two issues 
related to the value of the access to tax-exempt bond markets. First, we 
document the importance of  tax-exempt bonds for NFP hospitals. Sec- 
ond, we discuss how potential policy reforms would affect NFP hospitals’ 
value of issuing tax-exempt bonds. 
Table 9.9 reports data on the issuance of long-term nonrefunding tax- 
exempt bonds by type of issuer for 1988 to 1992: government, NFP hospi- 
tals, and other tax-exempt private activity. These data are unpublished 
Internal Revenue Service tabulations.26  The data exclude refunding issues, 
which are associated with refinancing of existing debt. Thus, these data 
should reflect borrowing for new investment. For 1992, the $10.3 billion 
in NFP hospital bonds accounted for 7.8 percent of the total tax-exempt 
bonds issued. The average bond issue was for $29.3 million. While other 
segments of the tax-exempt bond market grew by 49 percent between 1988 
and 1992, the value of NFP issues grew by  124 percent. To put this $10.3 
billion in perspective, it is useful to compare the proceeds of the bonds 
with the size of fixed assets of NFP hospitals. For a sample of 2,838 NFP 
hospitals with cost report data in both 1994 and 1995 and no change in 
ownership status, total fixed assets in 1995 are $102 billion with a median 
value of $18.5 million. Furthermore, the aggregate change in fixed assets 
(i.e., a measure of net investment) for these hospitals is $4.2 billion. Thus, 
the aggregate bond issuance of $10.3 billion is large relative to the stock 
and flow of fixed assets of NFP hospitals. 
While table 9.9 reports on the flow of new bond issues, the stock of 
outstanding debt depends both on new issues and the repayment of previ- 
ous bonds. For information on the stock of outstanding bonds, we present 
25. Data on the number of uninsured and per capita hospitalization expenses comes from 
26. We thank Marvin Schwartz of the Statistics of Income and Bruce Davie of the Trea- 
the Statistical  Abstract of the United States 1997. 
sury Department for assistance with the data. Table 9.9  Long-Term Tax-Exempt Bond Issuance, by Type of Issuer 
Total  Government Bonds  NFP Hospitals  Other Private Activity 
Year  Number  Amount  Number  Amount  Number  Amount  Number  Amount 
1988  11,217  86.9  9,245  53.5  208  4.6  1,764  28.8 
1989  12,024  94.8  9,284  61.9  250  6.3  2,490  26.6 
1990  12,646  106.8  10,317  70.6  265  6.6  2,064  29.6 
1991  12,827  122.1  10,458  86.3  369  11.1  2,000  24.7 
1992  11,877  132.9  9,937  97.5  352  10.3  1,588  25.1 
Source: The data are from unpublished tabulations from the Statistics  oflncome, Internal Revenue Service. 
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data collected by the IRS from the balance sheets of tax-exempt organiza- 
tions.*’ For 1994 (the most recent year with available data), NFP hospitals 
had $46.1 billion of outstanding tax-exempt debt. By  comparison, these 
hospitals reported aggregate fixed assets of $191 billion and total assets of 
$281 billion. Thus tax-exempt bonds are an important source of financing 
for NFP hospitals. 
These aggregate tabulations mask the heterogeneity in tax-exempt bond 
issuance among NFP hospitals. Only 19.7 percent of NFP hospitals have 
outstanding tax-exempt debt. Since issuing bonds has a fixed cost of un- 
derwriting, it is not surprising that the hospitals with outstanding tax- 
exempt bonds are much larger than the NFP hospitals without tax-exempt 
bonds; the hospitals with tax-exempt bonds have average fixed assets of 
$54.1 million compared to $14.6 million for those without tax-exempt 
debt. Conditional on having outstanding tax-exempt bonds, the median 
value of outstanding debt was $24.6 million. The median value of the ratio 
of outstanding tax-exempt debt to fixed assets was 0.769, which suggests 
that these hospitals are either highly leveraged or have substantial other 
assets. In support of the latter hypothesis, the median ratio of tax-exempt 
debt to total assets is only 0.336. 
While  these data indicate that  tax-exempt  bonds  are an  important 
source of financing for NFP hospitals, they do not give any information 
on the value of the tax “subsidy” from using tax-exempt bonds. Calculat- 
ing the value of the subsidy depends on the alternative policy under con- 
sideration as well as how the NFP hospitals use the proceeds from bor- 
rowing. Under current tax law, investors are willing to lend to tax-exempt 
issuers at lower interest rates than they lend to issuers of taxable debt be- 
cause they do not pay income taxes on interest from tax-exempt bonds. 
For example, the average current yield on AAA-rated tax-exempt munici- 
pal bonds is 5.29 percent for 20-year maturities; in contrast, 20-year U.S. 
Treasury bonds yield 6.68 percent. Thus, expressed as a percent of the 
yield on the taxable bonds, the tax-exempt bonds have a subsidy of  21 
percent for a 20-year yield. 
Morrisey, Wedig, and Hassan (1996) propose using this comparison of 
taxable and tax-exempt yields for valuing the tax benefit from tax-exempt 
borrowing. They impute the value of tax-exempt bonds as the interest 
rate differential  between taxable and tax-exempt bonds times the amount 
of  debt outstanding. Assuming a yield spread of  1.5 percentage points 
27. The data are from the public use files of form 990 returns of tax exempt organizations 
for reporting year 1994. The data are a stratified random sample of NFP organizations with 
oversampling of large organizations. Since hospitals are larger than most NFP organizations, 
the sample has almost all major NFP hospitals. The data include weights for estimating 
population statistics. Unlike the HCFA data, we cannot separate the IRS data by type of 
hospital. Therefore, these data include long-term and specialty hospitals in addition to the 
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(slightly higher than the spread between tax-exempt municipal debt and 
the relatively less risky U.S. Treasury bonds), this imputation implies that 
the $46.1 billion of outstanding NFP hospital tax-exempt debt creates an 
annual tax benefit of $691.5 million. This imputation approximates the 
value of issuing tax-exempt bonds in either of two situations. First, sup- 
pose that the policy alternative is to maintain the exemption from income 
taxes for NFP hospitals but to repeal their access to tax-exempt bor- 
rowing, and that NFP hospitals do not respond by borrowing less. Second, 
if the proceeds from the bonds are being invested in financial assets with 
higher rates of return than the tax-exempt bonds, then the yield spread 
captures the arbitrage profit from the investment strategy. 
This imputation  does not  measure the  value of  issuing tax-exempt 
bonds if the proceeds are being used to increase fixed assets and the policy 
alternative is the repeal of both the access to tax-exempt bonds and the 
income tax exemption. Under this policy alternative, the NFP hospitals 
would face a higher interest rate, but their interest payments would be 
deductible from the corporate tax base. With this more global change in 
the tax status of NFP hospitals, the hospitals would face an after-tax cost 
of borrowing of  (I -  tJi, where t, is the firm’s marginal corporate tax rate 
and i is the nominal interest rate on taxable bonds. As an example, sup- 
pose an NFP hospital can borrow at 1 percentage point above the current 
AAA-rated tax-exempt bond yield for 20 years for a total interest rate of 
6.29 percent; in contrast, a taxable hospital that can borrow at 1 percent- 
age point above the 20-year U.S. Treasury bond rate of 6.68 percent and 
faces a 35 percent marginal corporate tax rate has an after-tax cost of 
borrowing of 4.99 percent. Thus, the NFP hospital faces a higher after- 
tax cost of borrowing than its FP competitor. A full analysis of this prob- 
lem also depends on the investor-level tax rates and the degree to which 
these tax rates are capitalized into bond prices. For a general treatment of 
how tax-exempt bonds affect the cost of capital for NFP hospitals, see 
Wedig, Hassan, and Morrisey (1996). 
An important determinant of the value of issuing tax-exempt bonds is 
how the hospital uses the proceeds. Legally, the hospitals must demon- 
strate that the funds will be used for new construction and that they do 
not have access to other funds2*  Despite these legal requirements, many 
of the NFP hospitals with tax-exempt debt outstanding also have endow- 
ments. Since money is fungible, one could argue that to the extent that the 
endowment could be used to pay off tax-exempt debt, these hospitals are 
engaging in tax arbitrage. 
To get an upper bound on the amount of tax arbitrage undertaken by 
NFP hospitals, we use the IRS data on tax-exempt organizations to com- 
28. The legal restrictions on the use of the proceeds from tax-exempt borrowing have 
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pare the size of outstanding bonds with endowments. The value of the 
hospital’s endowment is the sum of investments in securities, real property 
(held for investment purposes), and other investments. For hospitals with 
endowments that exceed their tax-exempt debt outstanding, we  measure 
the amount of possible tax arbitrage as the outstanding tax-exempt debt. 
These hospitals could retire their entire bond liability by  reducing their 
endowment. Overall, 5.2 percent of NFP hospitals have endowments that 
exceed their tax-exempt bond liabilities. For hospitals with endowments 
that  are less than their tax-exempt debt outstanding, we  measure  the 
amount of possible tax arbitrage as their endowment. That is, these hospi- 
tals could only eliminate part of their bond liability by using their endow- 
ment.29  Of NFP hospitals, 11.7 percent have endowments that are less 
than their tax-exempt bond liabilities and 2.8 percent have tax-exempt 
bond liabilities but report an endowment value of zero. This calculation 
indicates that $23.6 billion, or just over half of the aggregate tax-exempt 
bond liability, is potentially related to arbitrage rather than new construc- 
tion. Valuing the tax benefit of  the arbitrage with a yield spread of  1.5 
percentage points suggests an annual tax benefit of $354 million. Since the 
yield spread depends on the tax rate of taxable investors, it increases with 
the level of the nominal interest rate. Thus, this tax advantage (either on 
the bonds associated with potential arbitrage or on all bonds, as in Wedig, 
Hassan, and Morrisey 1996) increases when interest rates are high. 
In summary, tax-exempt bonds are an important source of financing for 
NFP hospitals. However, if one takes as the policy alternative the repeal 
of both the exemption from income taxes and access to tax-exempt bond 
markets, it is unlikely that the overall tax exemption reduces the after-tax 
cost of  borrowing for NFP hospitals. Nevertheless, our examination of 
hospital balance sheet data from the IRS suggests that tax arbitrage may 
also lead to some of the tax-exempt borrowing. To  the extent that hospi- 
tals are getting around the complicated tax code restrictions on such ac- 
tivity, they benefit from profitable tax arbitrage. Our calculations suggest 
that these concerns are potentially relevant for approximately half of tax- 
exempt borrowing by NFP hospitals. 
9.6  Tax Benefits of Charitable Contributions 
The final piece of the tax benefit puzzle is the ability of NFP hospitals 
to solicit tax deductible contributions. Since NFP hospitals are 501 (c)(3) 
29. Our calculations assume that the hospitals do not need their endowments as a form 
of working capital or for precautionary saving. To  the extent that hospitals need to keep 
some investments for these purposes, we are overstating the amount of tax arbitrage. Also, 
gifts to the endowments sometimes come with restrictions on the disposition of the assets. We 
ignore these restrictions since they are potentially endogenous to the tax planning process. 
That is, the NFP hospital can use these restrictions to  justify engaging in financial arbitrage. The Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Hospitals  317 
organizations  for tax purposes, donors deduct their gifts from their income 
(and estate) tax bases (if they file income taxes as an “itemizer”). This 
deduction lowers the after-tax price of charitable giving.30  These contri- 
butions provide financing that is unavailable to FP hospitals. As with the 
use of tax-exempt bonds, we  are interested in two questions. First, How 
important  are charitable gifts as a  source of  financing? Second, How 
should we calculate the value of the tax exemption? 
We have two sources of data on the importance of charitable contribu- 
tions for NFP hospitals: (1) the cost report data include a variable on 
donations received; and (2) data from informational returns (Form 990) 
filed by  NFP hospitals with the IRS. These different data sources lead to 
different conclusions regarding the importance of charitable contribu- 
tions. The cost report data indicate that only 56 percent of NFP hospitals 
report receiving contributions. For  1995, aggregate contributions were 
$649 million (for our sample of 2,948 NFP hospitals), which amounted to 
0.26 percent of total assets for all hospitals or 0.49 percent of the total 
assets of  the hospitals that reported positive contributions. Conditional 
on receiving some contributions, the 25th percentile is  only $11,831 in 
contributions, and the median is $60,878. However, conditional on posi- 
tive contributions, the 95th percentile is $1.3 million, indicating that at 
least 83 hospitals received more than $1.3 million in donations in 1995. 
Overall, the cost report data suggest that contributions are a minor source 
of funding, except for a small set of hospitals. 
In contrast, in the IRS data for 1994, 77 percent of 501(c)(3) hospitals 
received public contributions (not including government grants) totaling 
$3.2 billion, These contributions are 1.15 percent of total assets and 2.72 
percent of fixed assets. Hence, the tax data suggest that charitable contri- 
butions are a nontrivial source of funds for NFP hospitals. Of the hospi- 
tals receiving contributions, the 25th percentile of the contribution distri- 
bution is $16,260 and the conditional median contribution is $71,820. 
These conditional values are similar to the cost report data values, albeit 
more hospitals report positive contributions to the IRS. The most striking 
difference in the two data sets is among large recipients; among hospitals 
reporting contributions to the IRS, the 95th percentile of the distribution 
of contributions is $2.82 million, suggesting that 200 hospitals receive con- 
tributions greater than this amount. This group of hospitals accounts for 
3.85 percent of all hospitals but receives 71 percent of the charitable con- 
tributions. While the tax data include a broader set of hospitals, which 
may explain part of the difference in aggregate contributions, this sample 
difference is unlikely to explain the difference in contributions relative to 
assets. 
30. For analyses of how taxes affect incentives to give to chanty, see Clotfelter (1985) and 
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While the data sources disagree on the overall magnitude of charitable 
contributions, both  sources indicate that  charitable contributions  are 
highly skewed toward a select group of hospitals. Auten, Clotfelter, and 
Schmalbeck (1997) provide further evidence on the importance of chari- 
table contributions to hospitals. They report that of large individual chari- 
table contributions of more than $5 million in 1996 (a total of $1.5 billion 
of gifts in all), 9.3 percent ($140 million) went to university-affiliated  medi- 
cal centers and 7.6 percent ($115 million) went to free-standing medical 
research  institution^.^^ 
In comparing charitable contributions with the fixed assets, we  are im- 
plicitly assuming that contributions are used to finance capital expendi- 
tures. These comparisons, at least with the IRS data, suggest that contri- 
butions are a modest, but important, source of financing. Alternatively, 
contributions could pay for services for less-fortunate patients; however, 
contributions are quite small relative to overall patient revenues (less than 
0.5 percent). The descriptions of the large gifts suggest that most large do- 
nations are for capital expenditures or large investments rather than cov- 
ering operating expenses. 
In estimating the value of the tax benefit of the deduction for charitable 
gifts, one needs to know the marginal tax rate of the donor. Given the 
information reported by Auten, Clotfelter, and Schmalbeck,  it seems likely 
that most of the donations to NFP  hospitals are from high-income taxpay- 
ers with high marginal tax rates. A static measure of the revenue cost of 
these provisions would be the marginal tax rate times the amount of the 
contributions. For example, if the average combined federal and state mar- 
ginal income tax rate for donors is 35 percent,32  then the $3.2 billion in 
charitable contributions reported in the IRS data imply a tax expenditure 
of $1.1 billion.33  However, if  tax rules singled-out NFP hospitals for a 
change in status, one would expect a large shift in where donors would 
give; also, one would expect universities and other medical centers to re- 
spond by setting up targeted foundations to serve specific needs, such as 
cancer research. Thus, it is difficult to imagine changing the tax policy 
3  1. Auten, Clotfelter, and Schmalbeck (1997) use data compiled by the electronic magazine 
Slate. In contrast, the 1993 IRS data for all 501(c)(3) organizations reports that hospitals 
received 5.8 percent of total contributions and government grants (see Internal Revenue 
Service 1997). These data do not include most religious organizations. Since Hodgkinson 
and Weitzman (1989, 41-42,  table 1.17) report that approximately two-thirds of household 
contributions go to religious organizations, hospitals’ total share in deductible contributions 
is substantially less than the 5.8 percent. 
32. This calculation assumes that all donors to hospitals itemize their deductions, which 
may lead to an overstatement of the tax expenditure. However, we ignore estate tax consider- 
ations, which could be quite important for wealthy donors. 
33. Our tax expenditure calculation is substantially less than the $2.1 billion reported for 
1994 in the U.S. federal budget (see U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997, table 523). Our calcula- 
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toward charitable gifts for NFP hospitals without changing the tax treat- 
ment of all charitable organizations. 
9.7  Dynamic Considerations and the Incidence 
of the Tax Treatment of NFP Hospitals 
The estimates in the previous sections provide evidence on the relative 
magnitude of the elements of the tax treatment of NFP hospitals. This 
information helps us understand the “statutory incidence’’ of the tax ex- 
emptions-how  much tax revenue the government loses and which agents 
would write checks to the government under alternative tax regimes. If 
prices and quantities remain unchanged by tax policy, then the static esti- 
mates of statutory incidence would also be the economic incidence (the 
ultimate beneficiaries after accounting for price and quantity changes) of 
the policy. One complication created by analyzing NFP organizations is 
that even with this set of static assumptions, it is unclear who benefits 
when the NFP organization has a tax windfall. In the context of a for- 
profit corporation, the shareholders are the assumed beneficiaries of such 
a windfall. Since NFP hospitals do not have shareholders, then the wind- 
fall will be distributed somehow through the various constituencies of the 
NFP hospital. In theory, these tax savings should accrue to the community 
through such benefits as uncompensated care. However, as we  discussed 
above, it is unclear how the community benefits differ across organiza- 
tional forms. An alternative possibility is that other stakeholders, such as 
doctors or other employees, benefit from the tax advantages. 
While assuming static behavior simplifies estimating the tax benefits, 
the economic incidence cannot be discerned by  calculating hypothetical 
tax payments. Instead, the economic incidence depends critically on the 
behavioral responses of NFP hospitals. Starting from the framework of 
no behavioral response, one needs to know how tax policy changes would 
affect prices, outputs, and inputs in the market for hospital services. In 
terms of  outputs, tax policy may affect many different dimensions. The 
tax exemptions may decrease the price of health care or increase the quan- 
tity of health care provided. If  the tax benefits are shifted forward onto 
consumers through lower prices, then it is less likely that the tax exemp- 
tions will generate resources for NFP hospitals to spend on other commu- 
nity benefits.34 
Traditional public finance models of incidence (see Shoven and Whalley 
1992 for a survey) suggest that taxing one sector less heavily than another 
34. Some analysts have argued that lower prices are a form of  community benefit (see 
Clement, Smith, and Wheeler 1994). Of course, lowering prices (and the associated income) 
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would lead to increased output in the lightly taxed sector. However, these 
models assume profit-maximizing investors allocating capital across sec- 
tors. For NFP hospitals, these traditional incidence channels probably do 
not work well. Even if the tax exemptions increase the quantity of health 
care, it is unclear whether this increase benefits needy people. The behav- 
ioral responses could also include changes in the quality of care (without 
a corresponding change in price) or the types of outputs provided (partic- 
ularly a shift toward outputs whose social returns exceed their private re- 
turns). 
These changes in the output market shift tax benefits forward onto con- 
sumers. Other behavioral responses would shift the tax benefits backward 
onto factors of production. The tax exemption could change the capital 
intensity of hospital production with the less heavily taxed NFP hospitals 
opting for a more capital intensive production function; however, our ev- 
idence in section 9.4 suggests that this effect is likely to be small. NFP 
hospitals could also respond by  “distributing” the tax benefit in the form 
of higher wages or better working conditions. Better working conditions 
could include more workers per bed, as we  document in table 9.4. Con- 
sumers may benefit if  the increase in the number of workers results in 
higher quality care (a form of shifting of tax benefits to the consumer if 
the price does not increase); however, workers may also benefit if  they 
work less intensely for the same pay. Lastly, the NFP hospitals can engage 
in behaviors that skirt the restrictions on private inurement and private 
benefit by  attempting to distribute the tax benefits to insiders, such as 
managers or doctors. An example of such behavior is joint ventures be- 
tween hospitals and physicians (for details on these joint ventures and the 
associated legislative concerns, see U. S. General Accounting Office 1993). 
One additional behavioral response also deserves mention: The organi- 
zational form of hospitals may depend on the value of the tax exemptions. 
Gulley and Santerre (1993) examine this hypothesis using panel data on 
market shares of NFP and FP hospitals in different states. Consistent with 
expectation, they find that higher state corporate income taxes and higher 
local property taxes increase the market share of NFP hospitals. To  the 
extent that organizational form is more than a label for tax purposes, these 
tax-induced changes in organizational form affect the characteristics of 
care provided in different markets. 
In addition to incidence, public finance economists are concerned with 
the excess burden associated with tax policy. The excess burden of the tax 
exemption depends on how the lost revenue is raised. The low tax rate on 
the production of health care through NFP organizations must be com- 
pensated for by  raising tax rates on other goods. To  estimate the excess 
burden associated with this change in tax rates requires knowing the de- 
mand and supply elasticities for various types of  goods. Estimating the 
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possibility that the exemptions encourage the provision of community 
benefits. If the tax exemption serves as a corrective tax that encourages 
the production of  goods with positive externalities, the excess burden is 
less than would otherwise be calculated by examining the elasticities of 
supply and demand for different goods. Thus, as with the question of eco- 
nomic incidence, understanding the excess burden associated with the tax 
exemption requires a model of the behavioral responses and social benefits 
of NFP hospitals. 
In summary, our calculations focus on the relatively straightforward 
measurement of the statutory incidence of the tax treatment of NFP hos- 
pitals. These estimates provide a useful starting point for framing the de- 
bate on tax policy toward NFP hospitals. However, they are a starting 
point, rather than an ending point, for understanding the economic impli- 
cations of tax policy toward NFP hospitals. 
9.8  Conclusion 
In this paper, we  explore the size and heterogeneity of  the tax breaks 
granted to NFP  hospitals. The tax breaks include exemption from income 
tax, exemption from property tax, use of tax-exempt bonds, and the tax 
deductibility of contributions to the hospital. In terms of nontax charac- 
teristics, NFP and FP hospitals are similar in many ways, though there 
are some important differences across organizational forms. One striking 
difference between NFP and FP hospitals is their geographic location. 
Across states, FP  hospitals’ market share of beds ranges from zero to over 
30 percent. The median NFP hospital is larger than the median FP  hospi- 
tal; however, the size distribution of NFP hospitals is quite dispersed, in- 
cluding some very small hospitals as well as the large, urban teaching cen- 
ters. Patient characteristics as measured by  the proportion of Medicaid 
and Medicare patients and the HCFA case-mix index are remarkably simi- 
lar for FP and NFP hospitals. Analysis of the provision of several hospital 
services viewed to be either community benefits or specialized shows sig- 
nificant differences between forms, though we  find significant intraform 
differences as well. The similarities across organizational forms suggest 
that the tax exemptions are not essential to the provision of health care; 
however, further research is needed to determine whether the incentive 
effects or distributional effects of the tax exemptions  justify their existence. 
The value of the exemption from capital taxes depends on capital inten- 
sity and, for the income tax, profitability. Despite technological advances 
in medicine, hospitals remain more labor intensive than nonservice indus- 
tries. Perhaps surprisingly, given the capital tax break, FP hospitals are 
more capital intensive than their NFP counterparts. The FP  hospitals are 
also more profitable than the NFP hospitals. For some NFP hospitals, 
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of the aggregate value of the capital tax exemptions for NFP hospitals are 
$4.6 billion from income taxes and $1.7 billion from property taxes. 
The tax benefits of tax-exempt bond financing and charitable contribu- 
tions are concentrated among a relatively small set of hospitals. Less than 
20 percent of NFP hospitals have outstanding tax-exempt debt, and chari- 
table contributions are highly skewed toward an elite group of hospitals. 
Compared to FP hospitals that pay higher interest rates but deduct inter- 
est payments from taxable income, it is unclear how much of an advantage 
tax-exempt bonds provide NFP hospitals for building new facilities. If, 
however, the tax-exempt borrowing allows the NFP hospitals to maintain 
their endowments while expanding their facilities, then the NFP hospitals 
benefit from tax arbitrage. We  find that almost half of outstanding tax- 
exempt debt of NFP hospitals could be offset by  their endowments, lead- 
ing to an arbitrage benefit of $354 million per year. For charitable contri- 
butions in 1994, we estimate that the $3.6 billion of donations lowered the 
donors’ tax liabilities by about $1.1 billion. 
As emphasized in section 9.7, our estimates do not include the behav- 
ioral responses caused by the tax exemptions. A full understanding of the 
impact of the tax exemptions requires estimates of how NFP and FP  hos- 
pitals respond to tax incentives. An important behavioral margin is the 
choice of  organizational form, which depends on tax benefits as well as 
the costs and benefits of nontax characteristics of each form. The continu- 
ing trend of hospital conversions may offer one way to examine these is- 
sues using longitudinal data with changing organizational form. 
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